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THE TEXAS NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
PROCESS-A PROPOSAL TO RECONCILE
THE PROCEDURES MANDATED BY
STATE LAW WITH THE
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE PRINCIPLES
OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
by
Alan S. Gover* and Glenn D. West**
HE nonjudicial foreclosure process in Texas has, for over a century,
permitted lenders considerable ease in recovering mortgaged real es-
tate and fixing deficiency liabilities of borrowers. The statutorily
mandated procedures' are both simple and efficient, and no one-action or
anti-deficiency 2 statutes limit the range of remedies available to a lender or
dictate the price that a lender must bid at a nonjudicial sale. So relatively
unfettered is the Texas nonjudicial foreclosure process that the only practical
defense for the defaulting borrower has often been the filing of a petition for
relief in the bankruptcy courts.
Federal bankruptcy law has always been a theoretical haven for the debtor
aggrieved by an economically unfair foreclosure sale.3 In 1980, however, a
* A.B., Tufts College; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center. Partner, Weil, Got-
shal & Manges, Houston, Texas.
** B.A., Tarleton State University; J.D., Texas Tech University School of Law. Partner,
Weil, Gotshal & Manges, Dallas, Texas.
The authors wish to acknowledge the research assistance of Peter B. Haskel, Courtney John-
son, and Jill Schlessinger in connection with the preparation of this Article.
1. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 52.001 (Vernon 1984).
2. A "one-action" statute is any of a variety of statutes requiring that there be only one
action to recover a debt and enforce the security for that debt. E.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §
726(a) (West Supp. 1987). An "anti-deficiency" statute is any of a variety of statutes that
prohibit or limit the rights of a creditor to recover a deficiency judgment against a debtor
following the foreclosure of real property security. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(b)
(West Supp. 1987). For an excellent discussion of the variety of different one-action and anti-
deficiency statutes in the various states, see Fitch v. Buffalo Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 751 P.2d
1309 (Wyo. 1988).
3. Bankruptcy Code § 548, 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988) establishes independent federal
grounds for avoidance of fraudulent transfers as defined by that section. In addition, Bank-
ruptcy Code § 544(b), I I U.S.C. § 544(b) (1988) incorporates by reference all non-bankruptcy
avoidance law for use by a trustee or debtor in bankruptcy court, including the applicable state
fraudulent transfer law. Bankruptcy Code § 550(a), 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1988) provides, in
substance, that the debtor or trustee may then recover such avoided transfer, or, upon court
order, the value thereof, from an immediate or subsequent transferee or any entity for whose
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federal court decision aimed the bankruptcy apparatus specifically at this
problem. In that year, in Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co. ,' the
Fifth Circuit for the first time5 applied bankruptcy's fraudulent conveyance
principles to a nonjudicial foreclosure sale and held that such a sale consti-
tuted a transfer within the meaning of section 67(d) of the Bankruptcy Act.6
Having established the statutory link, the Fifth Circuit determined that the
transfer effected by a foreclosure sale for only 57.7% of the admitted fair
market value of the property was not made for fair consideration within the
meaning of that statute and, therefore, was subject to avoidance as a fraudu-
lent conveyance. In so holding, the court also mused about standards of fair
market value, observing that no prior case soley involving section 67(d) of
the Bankruptcy Act had approved a real estate transfer under section 67(d)
"for less than 70 percent of the market value of the property."17
Although the reference to 70% has been frequently interpreted as a
benchmark for judging the sufficiency of the sales price obtained at a nonju-
dicial foreclosure sale,8 Durrett did not hold that a sale for 70% of fair mar-
ket value would always constitute fair consideration (or now reasonably
equivalent value under section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code), nor that a
sale at less than 70% of fair market value would always constitute less than
fair consideration (or a reasonably equivalent value). Nevertheless, confu-
sion over a "Durrett 70% rule" has lasted almost ten years.9
benefit such transfer was made. For a more detailed discussion of the operation of the Bank-
ruptcy Code provisions for avoidance of fraudulent transfers, see Haskel & Lynn, Preference
and Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation, in SMU SCHOOL OF LAW THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE
ON ADVANCED BANKRUPTCY LAW, LITIGATING IN THE BANKRUPTCY COURT: PRACTICE
STRATEGIES AND CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 1989 11-1 (M. Rochelle ed. 1989); Tatelbaum &
Wannamaker, Recovering Fraudulently Conveyed Assets, in BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE AND
STRATEGY 8.01-8.10 (A. Resnick ed. 1987).
4. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
5. See Coppell & Kahn, Defanging Durrett: The Established Law of Transfer, 100
BANKING L.J. 676, 676-77 (1983).
6. Section 67(d) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1898) (repealed 1978), the
predecessor of § 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1988), declared fraudu-
lent any "transfer" made within one year of the filing of a bankruptcy proceeding if the trans-
fer was made "without fair consideration" (or under § 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, at "less
than a reasonably equivalent value") by a debtor who was then insolvent or who was thereby
rendered insolvent. Durrett, 621 F.2d at 202.
7. 621 F.2d at 203.
8. See, e.g., Richard v. Tempest (In re Richard), 26 Bankr. 560, 562 (Bankr. D.R.I.
1983); Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 448 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1982); Perdido Bay Country Club Estates, Inc. v. Equitable Trust Co. (In re Perdido Bay
Country Club Estates, Inc.), 23 Bankr. 36, 39 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); Coleman v. Home Sav.
Ass'n (In re Coleman), 21 Bankr. 832, 834 (Bankr. S.D. Texas 1982); Home Life Ins. Co. v.
Jones (In re Jones), 20 Bankr. 988, 993 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); Wickham v. United Am. Bank
(In re Thompson), 18 Bankr. 67, 70 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982); Marshall v. Spindle Sav. &
Loan Ass'n (In re Marshall), 15 Bankr. 738, 744 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1981); see also Alden,
Gross & Borowitz, Real Property Foreclosure as a Fraudulent Conveyance. Proposals for Solv-
ing the Durrett Problem, 38 BUS. LAW 1605, 1613 n.22 (1983) (although Durrett cited for 70%
rule, case held that only 57.7% of fair market value does not constitute reasonably equivalent
value).
9. The following constitute a sample of the numerous articles that have been written on
the Durrett controversy. Alden, Gross & Borowitz, supra note 8, at 1605; Berman & Fierberg,
Durrett: The Problem and Suggestions for its Solution, 90 CoM. L.J. 162 (1985); Castanares,
Foreclosures in Bankruptcy: Are They Fraudulent Conveyances?, 21 IDAHO L. REV. 517
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As economic conditions in Texas deteriorated during the past decade, and
foreclosures and bankruptcies proliferated, concern over the implications of
Durrett has caused an almost de facto minimum bid practice to develop
among lenders bidding at Texas nonjudicial foreclosure sales. 10 Moreover,
recent Texas cases have begun to question the consistent line of Texas au-
thority establishing both the rule that inadequacy of price alone is not suffi-
cient to set aside a foreclosure sale and the rule that the amount the
borrower is entitled to have credited against the secured debt, for the pur-
poses of a deficiency action following a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, is deter-
mined solely by reference to the amount actually paid to or credited by the
lender at such sale.'" Similarly, in mid-1989 the Texas Legislature almost
enacted new legislation to provide debtors a means of causing the lender,
following a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, to credit against the secured debt
the fair market value of the property sold at such sale.12
While many bankruptcy courts in the Fifth Circuit apply some variation
(1985); Cohn, Foreclosures as Fraudulent Transfers: Solving the Durrett Problem, 103 BANK-
ING L.J. 259 (1986); Davis & Standiford, Foreclosure Sale as Fraudulent Transfer Under the
Bankruptcy Code: A Reasonable Approach to Reasonably Equivalent Value, 13 REAL EST. L.J.
203 (1985); Fierberg, Durrett After the 1984 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 59 FLA.
B.J. July-Aug. 1985, at 41; Grossman, Pre-Bankruptcy Forfeiture of Installment Land Con-
tracts for the Sale of Farmland, 8 J. AGRIC. TAX & L. 357 (1987); Henning, An Analysis of
Durrett and its Impact on Real and Personal Property Foreclosures: Some Proposed Modifica-
tions, 63 N.C.L. REV. 257 (1985); Nelson, The Impact of Mortgagor Bankruptcy On the Real
Estate Mortgagee: Current Problems and Some Suggested Solutions, 50 Mo. L. REV. 217
(1985); Reamer, Upsetting the Law of Transfer: Mortgage Foreclosures as Fraudulent Convey-
ances Under the Bankruptcy Code, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 321 (1989); Roberts & Moriarty,
Mortgage Foreclosure Sales as Fraudulent Conveyances: The Durrett Issue, 10 OKLA. CITY
U.L. REV. 579-602 (1985); Schuchman, Data on the Durrett Controversy, 9 CARDOZO L. REV.
605 (1987); Shupack, Confusion in Policy and Language in the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 811 (1987); Simpson, Real Property Foreclosures: The Fallacy of
Durrett, 19 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 73 (1984); Weintraub & Resnick, From the Bank-
ruptcy Courts-Mortgage Foreclosure Sales as Fraudulent Conveyances-Does the 1984 Act
Make a Difference?, 17 U.C.C. L.J. 376 (1985); Zinman, Durrett Data: Shucking the Husks
from the Grain, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1013 (1988); Zinman, Nonconclusive, Regularly Con-
ducted Foreclosure Sales: Involuntary, Nonfraudulent Transfers, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 581
(1987); Zinman, Durrett: Yin and Yang, 13 PROB. & PROP. 49 (1985); Zinman, Houle &
Weiss, Fraudulent Transfers According to Alden, Gross & Borowitz: A Tale of Two Circuits, 39
Bus. LAW. 977 (1984); Comment, Mortgage Foreclosure Sales as Fraudulent Conveyances:
Living Under Durrett, 13 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 631 (1986); Comment, Mortgage Foreclosure as
Fraudulent Conveyance: Is Judicial Foreclosure an Answer to the Durrett Problem?, 1984 Wis.
L. REV. 195; Note, Nonjudicial Foreclosure Under Deed of Trust may be a Fraudulent Transfer
of Bankrupt's Property, 47 Mo. L. REV. 345 (1982); Counsel's Corner, Durrett - Chink in the
Armor?, 103 BANKING L.J. 79 (1986).
10. See In re Raylin Dev. Co. (No. 88-1221), 3 Tex. Bankr. Ct. Rptr. 490, 494 n.10
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. June 30, 1989) (order on motion for valuation of assets).
11. See Olney Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Farmers Market of Odessa Inc., 764 S.W.2d 869, 871
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, writ pending); Halter v. Allied Merchants Bank, 751 S.W.2d 286,
288 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, writ denied); see also Lee v. Sabine Bank, 708 S.W.2d 582,
584 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (lender with secured collateral has duty to
make honest effort to reduce debt by getting fair price at foreclosure). But see Savers Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. Reetz, 888 F.2d 1497, 1503-06 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying Texas law); Greater
Southwest Office Park, Ltd. v. Texas Commerce Bank N.A., No. 01-89-00314-CV, slip op. at
6-7 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] Jan. 18, 1990, n.w.h.) (inadequacy of price alone insuffi-
cient to set aside trustee's sale).
12. See infra text accompanying note 70.
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of the Durrett 70% rule as a basis for post-bankruptcy avoidance of state
foreclosures, certain commentators13 and a recent decision from the Seventh
Circuit14 have suggested that the determination of reasonably equivalent
value under section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code should not be based
upon a simple comparison of the price obtained with an appraiser's opinion
of fair market value. Rather, one should examine the procedures used in
conducting the foreclosure "sale to determine whether commercially reason-
able steps were taken to achieve the best price at the foreclosure."'1 5 Accord-
ing to this view, if the lender has taken commercially reasonable steps in the
sale, the price obtained at such a sale is a better indicator of reasonably
equivalent value for the purposes of section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
than an appraiser's opinion of the price that would have been obtained at a
theoretical sale.
Given the turbulence in bankruptcy court decisions in this area and the
apparent willingness of the Texas Legislature, as well as some Texas courts,
to consider changing the rules governing the long-standing and highly abbre-
viated procedures for nonjudicial foreclosures, the time may be ripe for an
overhaul of the Texas nonjudicial foreclosure process. Unlike the Texas
Legislature's efforts in 1989 to limit deficiency judgments by an artificial de-
termination of the fair market value of foreclosed real estate, the authors
believe that the much more fundamental need under Texas foreclosure law is
to establish procedures calculated to yield the fairest possible price under the
circumstances, while recognizing the limitations inherent in a forced sale,
and eschew the probably futile attempt to suggest any specific formula that
would yield a presumptively standard, fair, or reasonable price. 16
The authors believe that the Texas legislature should focus its efforts on
changing the procedures used in conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure sale
rather than simply addressing the inadequacy of the price obtained under
existing procedures.17 Likewise, the authors believe that the pertinent in-
quiry in the bankruptcy courts for reasonable equivalence in the context of a
foreclosure sale is whether the procedures employed were designed to
achieve the highest price possible, not whether the price obtained constituted
a specified percentage or approximation of fair market value.' 8
In order to explore these themes, section I of this Article traces the history
13. Ehrlich, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales as Fraudulent Conveyances: Accommodating
State and Federal Objectives, 71 VA. L. REV. 933, 960-61 (1985); Comment, Avoidance of
Foreclosure Sales as Fraudulent Transfers Under Section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code: An
Impetus to Changing State Foreclosure Procedures, 66 NEB. L. REV. 383, 409 (1987) (hereinaf-
ter Comment, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales). These articles helped focus the authors' sug-
gested revisions to the Texas foreclosure laws on the procedures used rather than on the price
obtained.
14. Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 865 F.2d 815, 820 (7th Cir. 1988).
15. Lindsay v. Beneficial Reinsurance Co.(In re Lindsay), 98 Bankr. 983, 991 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. 1989).
16. "I must admit that I possess no instinct by which to know the 'reasonable' from the
'unreasonable' in prices and must seek some conscious design for decision." Federal Power
Comm'n. v. Hope, 320 U.S. 591, 645 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).




of the power of sale in Texas, including the various legislative attempts to
regulate its use. Section II examines the concept of reasonably equivalent
value under the Bankruptcy Code, tracing the development of fraudulent
conveyance law as applied to foreclosure sales. Finally, section III suggests
certain amendments to the Texas nonjudicial foreclosure process that would
be designed to achieve the highest price possible without unnecessarily re-
quiring the lender to credit against the secured debt a minimum bid price
that is based solely upon an appraiser's opinion of fair market value. The
suggested amendments are designed as much as possible so that state fore-
closure law can be reconciled with the fraudulent conveyance principles of
the Bankruptcy Code.
I. THE DEED OF TRUST AND THE POWER OF SALE IN TEXAS
A. Current Practice
On the first Tuesday of every month one can witness the legal ritual
known as the nonjudicial foreclosure sale at county courthouses throughout
Texas. Pursuant to previously published notices mandated by Texas law,1 9 a
trustee (usually an attorney for or an officer of the lender) announces to
those present, if any, his or her intent to sell, at public auction, certain real
estate securing a debt now in default. After completing the formalities of
describing the land and the debt, the trustee asks the assembled mass of
interested onlookers or no one at all: "Are there any bids?" For a brief
moment the trustee obligingly waits for a bid from a third party bidder, who
is almost never there. Some third party occasionally does speak up in re-
sponse to the trustee's question, but not often. In the absence of third party
bidders the trustee or an officer or agent of the lender will bid a stated
amount as a credit against the secured debt. The sale is then concluded and
the land is conveyed to the lender. 20
Although simple and efficient, the exercise of a secured lender's power of
sale under a deed of trust in the manner previously described has been la-
belled by at least one Texas court as a "harsh remedy." '21 Contrary to popu-
lar opinion, a lender is not required to bid any specified amount at a
nonjudicial foreclosure sale in Texas. If the lender observes all of the for-
malities, a nonjudicial foreclosure sale will not be invalidated merely because
the price obtained is below the fair market value of the land. 22 Moreover,
the price bid at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale is ordinarily conclusive evi-
19. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 52.001 (Vernon 1984).
20. For another description of a generic nonjudicial foreclosure sale, see Comment, Avoid-
ance of Foreclosure Sales, supra note 13, at 384-85, which the authors located after they penned
the above description.
21. See Purnell v. Follett, 555 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1977, no writ).
22. American Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Musick, 531 S.W.2d 581, 587 (Tex. 1975); Tarrant
Say. Ass'n v. Lucky Homes, Inc., 390 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tex. 1965); Crow v. Davis, 435
S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Richardson v. Kent, 47
S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1932, no writ); see also W. BAGGETT, TEXAS FORE-
CLOSURE: LAW & PRACTICE § 2.61, § 2.61 n.167 (1984) (discussing rule that inadequacy of
consideration not sufficient to set aside foreclosure sale).
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dence of the credit to which the debtor was entitled as a result of the sale of
the land securing a debt. 23 The deficiency remaining after the nonjudicial
sale is subject to collection by the lender regardless of the actual value of the
land acquired or whether the lender realizes a profit upon its resale. 24
In the most recent regular session of the Texas Legislature, a bill was
enacted that would have permitted a debtor to require the lender, in an ac-
tion to collect a deficiency following a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, to credit
against the secured debt the lesser of the outstanding balance of the secured
debt or the fair market value of the land sold.25 Although vetoed by the
Governor, the bill focused renewed attention on the inequities that can arise
under current Texas law from the lender's exercise of its power of sale, par-
ticularly in view of the devastating decline of Texas real estate values in
recent years. In order to examine the propriety of this legislative effort, it is
necessary first to understand the historical underpinnings of the nonjudicial
foreclosure process in Texas.
B. Historical Development of Nonjudicial Foreclosure in Texas
1. General Background
A deed of trust as used in Texas purports to be a conveyance of the land
covered thereby to a trustee as security for a debt, subject to a condition of
defeasance or redemption upon the repayment of such debt. 26 It has long
been held in Texas, however, that no title passes as a result of the execution
of a deed of trust. 27 Rather, the legal effect of a deed of trust is to create a
lien on the land covered thereby in favor of the creditor, as security for the
debt, and to authorize the trustee to sell the land upon default in the pay-
ment of the debt "without necessity of resort to litigation. '28 In other
words, a deed of trust is merely a mortgage creating a lien in favor of the
mortgagee and containing a power of sale in favor of a third party trustee. 29
23. Maupin v. Chaney, 163 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Tex. 1942); Martin v. Uvalde Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 773 S.W.2d 808, 814 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, n.w.h); Whalen v. State Farm
Auto Ins. Co., 428 S.W.2d 824, 830 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
24. W. BAGGETT, supra note 22, §§ 2.62, 2.71.
25. Tex. S.B. 452, 71st Leg. (1989) (vetoed).
26. Lucky Homes, Inc. v. Tarrant Say. Ass'n, 379 S.W.2d 386, 388 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 390 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. 1965); see also 30 TEX. JUR. 3D,
Deeds of Trust and Mortgages § 2 (1983) (in Texas, trust deed is legal equivalent of mortgage
with power of sale).
27. See McLane v. Pascal, 47 Tex. 365, 369 (1877).
28. Lucky Homes Inc., 379 S.W.2d at 388.
29. Johnson v. Snell, 504 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex. 1973); Southern Trust & Mortgage Co. v.
Daniel, 43 Tex. 32, 184 S.W.2d 465, 467 (1944); Alliance Milling Co. v. Eaton, 86 Tex. 401, 25
S.W. 614, 615 (1894); Aggs v. Shackelford County, 85 Tex. 145, 19 S.W. 1085, 1086 (1892);
Jackson v. Harby, 65 Tex. 710, 714-15 (1886); Thornton v. Goodman, 216 S.W. 147, 148 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1919, opinion adopted); Cortez v. Brownsville Nat'l Bank, 664 S.W.2d 805,
809-10 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ); Phillips v. Campbell, 480 S.W.2d 250, 253
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Graham & Locke Invs., Inc. v.
Madison, 295 S.W.2d 234, 242 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dall v. Lind-
sey, 237 S.W.2d 1006, 1008 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Cunningham v.
Paschall, 135 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1939, writ dism'd).
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A power of sale in mortgages, although permitted under Roman law,30
was not used extensively in England prior to the nineteenth century. 31 In
the United States the power of sale was apparently in use somewhat earlier
than in England, as a statute relating to its use was enacted in New York in
1774.32 Although several early English cases expressed some doubt as to the
validity of a power of sale in a mortgage, 33 the power of sale has been gener-
ally recognized in this country, except where it was expressly prohibited by
statute.34 Because a power of sale is a right created by contract and not a
creation of the common law or statutory enactment, 35 it has been upheld
largely on the basis of ordinary principles of freedom of contract. 36
2. Early Statutory Regulation of the Manner of Conducting Nonjudicial
Foreclosure Sales in Texas
The deed of trust gained early acceptance in Texas.37 The familiar scene
at the courthouse steps on the first Tuesday of the month, however, was not
a necessary part of the early use of the power of sale in Texas. Indeed, prior
to the passage of the first Texas statute regulating the use of powers of sale,
the only required notices and procedures governing the sale of the land by
the trustee were those agreed to in the deed of trust between the mortgagor
and the mortgagee. 38 No law required uniformity of time, manner, or place
in conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure sale in Texas. 39 Although the courts
required strict compliance with the specific provisions of the deed of trust,
the procedures were so loose that one court remarked that many deeds of
trust had simply become "absolute conveyances" to the mortgagee.
4 °
The first Texas legislation regulating the use of powers of sale was enacted
on March 21, 1889.4 1 The purpose of this legislation was to prescribe the
place and time for sales conducted pursuant to powers conferred by deeds of
30. L. JONES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES OF REAL PROPERTY 437 (7th ed.
1915).
31. Turner, The English Mortgage of Land as Security, 20 VA. L. REV. 729, 732 (1934).
32. L. JONES, supra note 30, at 440-41.
33. G. GLENN, MORTGAGES, DEEDS OF TRUST AND OTHER SECURITY DEVICES AS TO
LAND 612 (1943); L. JONES, supra note 30, at 437.
34. G. GLENN, supra note 33, at 613; L. JONES, supra note 30, at 441.
35. International Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Hardy, 86 Tex. 610, 26 S.W. 497, 500 (1894).
36. L. JONES, supra note 30, at 442. As stated in an early decision by the New Hamphire
Supreme Court:
[W]e are unable to see upon what ground, in the absence of legislative prohibi-
tion, the court can put a restriction upon the freedom of the citizen to contract
for the sale of his land upon terms and in a mode stipulated in a mortgage, any
more than upon his liberty to contract for its sale in any other way, or by stipu-
lations contained in any other instrument.
Very v. Russell, 65 N.H. 464, 23 A. 522, 522 (1874).
37. See, e.g., Hess v. Dean, 66 Tex. 663, 664, 2 S.W. 727, 728 (1886).
38. West & McDonald, Deed of Trust Foreclosures--Selected Issues, Advanced Creditors
Rights Course (State Bar of Texas) at F-I (1988).
39. Id.
40. Id. (citing Wylie v. Hays, 114 Tex. 46, 49, 263 S.W. 563, 566 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1924, opinion adopted)).
41. Id. at F-2.
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trust.42 The 1889 Act required all sales to be made at a public auction to be
held between the hours of 10 o'clock a.m. and 4 o'clock p.m. on the first
Tuesday of any month, in the county where the land covered by the deed of
trust was located, after notice of such sale had been posted at least twenty
days prior to the sale in three public places, including the courthouse door.43
With a few modifications and amendments, the basic requirements set forth
in the 1889 Act remain those currently in force under section 52.001 of the
Texas Property Code.
In light of the broad range of procedures available to lenders prior to the
enactment of the 1889 Act, it is not surprising that the 1889 Act met with
considerable resistance in the courts. Indeed, in International Building &
Loan Association v. Hardy" the Texas Supreme Court declared the 1889 Act
unconstitutional to the extent it applied to sales conducted pursuant to deeds
of trust entered into prior to the effective date of the Act. The court based
its holding on the fact that the right of the trustee to sell the land covered by
a deed of trust was one created solely by the contract of the parties. While
the legislature was free to modify remedies created by statute or common
law, the court held that a remedy arising solely from contract could not be
retroactively altered.4 5
The preference of the Texas courts for the sanctity of private contract over
legislative fiat did not hold when the 1889 Act was later challenged in its
prospective, rather than retroactive, application. In Wylie v. Hays4 6 the
Texas Commission of Appeals held that a trustee's sale conducted in compli-
ance with the 1889 Act, but in contravention of the terms of the deed of
trust, was valid.47 Although the deed of trust had been entered into subse-
quent to the passage of the 1889 Act, it nevertheless required the trustee to
sell the land in the county where the mortgagor and mortgagee were both
residents, rather than in the county where the land was located as required
by the Act.48 The trustee had conducted the sale in conformance to the Act
by holding the sale in the county where the land was located. Because the
deed of trust required the sale to be held elsewhere, however, the mortgagor
argued that the sale was void and that the Act was unconstitutional to the
extent it purported to deprive the parties of the freedom to contract for the
sale of the land in a county other than where the land was located. The
court, while acknowledging that a power of sale is a "valuable contractual
right, the full and free exercise of which is [constitutionally guaranteed], ' 49
also noted that this contractual right may nevertheless be "regulated, or in
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing International Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Hardy, 86 Tex. 610, 26 S.W. 497
(1894)).
44. 86 Tex. 610, 613, 26 S.W. 497, 500 (1894).
45. Id. In Hardy, the only material difference between the requirements of the deed of
trust and those specified by the 1889 Act was that the 1889 Act required twenty days notice
and the deed of trust required only ten. Id.
46. 114 Tex. 46, 263 S.W. 563 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924, opinion adopted).
47. Id. at 61, 263 S.W. at 569-70.
48. Id. at 53, 263 S.W. at 565-66.
49. Id. at 51, 263 S.W. at 565.
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certain instances denied by the Legislature in a proper use of the police
power." 50
In determining whether the 1889 Act was a "valid exercise of that power"
and therefore "superior to the liberty of contract," the court was obligated to
determine whether the Act "has as its object that which may be clearly and
reasonably considered by the Legislature to be the public welfare, prescribes
means reasonably calculated and necessary to aid in accomplishing that ob-
ject, and operates in a reasonable and not an arbitrary, capricious, or oppres-
sive manner." 5' Noting the abuses to which debtors had been subjected
through the use of unregulated powers of sale, which were "so worded as
practically to prevent a mortgagor from saving his equity in the land,"152 the
court held that the 1889 Act was a valid exercise of the police power 53 and
therefore constitutional as applied to deeds of trust entered into after the
date of the Act.5 4
Since the adoption of the 1889 Act the legislature has made few improve-
ments in the nonjudicial foreclosure process in Texas. Sales are still required
to be held on the first Tuesday of the month, although the required notice
has been increased to twenty-one days.5 5 On the other hand, the require-
ment that the notice be posted in three public places has been eliminated.
Under current law the notice is required to be given by certified mail to all
persons obligated on the debt and to be filed with the county clerk and
posted at the courthouse of the county where the sale will be held.5 6
Although sales can still only be held between the hours of 10 o'clock a.m.
and 4 o'clock p.m., the required notice must state the earliest time at which
the sale will commence, and the sale must be actually held within three
hours after the stated time.5 7 Likewise, although the county where some
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 58, 263 S.W. at 56.
53. Id. In so holding, the court noted:
In the light of what has been observed, it is thought that the provision of the
Texas statute, which makes it necessary for the sale in this state to take place in
the county where the land lies, being the one in question in this case, is calcu-
lated to be a wise regulation and one that is for the public welfare. The size and
extent of the state of Texas furnish so wide a range as to place of sale that, if the
matter be left without regulation, provisions can be readily made in any mort-
gage or deed of trust that will render the presentation of the mortgagor's rights
at a sale extremely inconvenient, if not impossible, and that, because of the re-
moteness and inaccessibility of the land and of the records of title to the prop-
erty, are calculated to destroy bidding, in that strangers to the land and its
possession and title will not ordinarily be willing to purchase .... These provi-
sions [of the Act] reasonably tend to assist in guaranteeing that mortgages and
deed of trust shall not have the effect of absolute conveyances, but shall have
that of security only.
Id. at 56, 263 S.W. at 567.
54. Id. at 58, 263 S.W. at 568. The court also ruled that the Act could be constitutionally
applied to deeds of trust entered into before the date of the Act if the deed of trust in creating
the power of sale made reference to compliance with the law, which would have contemplated
the law as amended from time to time. Id. at 57, 263 S.W. at 567.
55. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
56. Id. § 51.002(b)(1)-(3).
57. Id. § 51.002(a).
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part of the land covered by the deed of trust is located remains the required
place to hold the sale, sales are now required to be held in a more clearly
defined area within the county courthouse, either as designated by the
County Commissioners Court or, in the absence of such designation, as spec-
ified in the required notice.58
While the 1889 Act and the various amendments may have allowed a
debtor to be more assured of his right to participate in the sale, neither the
1889 Act nor any of these amendments appear to have fostered competitive
bidding. As previously indicated, a third party bidder is a rare sight at a
nonjudicial foreclosure sale in Texas. Consequently, notwithstanding the
1889 Act and the various amendments thereafter enacted prescribing the
procedures for nonjudicial foreclosure sales in Texas, the price realized at
such a sale rarely approximates the market value of the land.59
3. Texas Legislative Efforts to Limit Deficiencies Resulting from
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Sales
In the 1930s the Texas Legislature again recognized the harshness of the
nonjudicial foreclosure process. The focus of the legislature in the 1930s,
however, was not upon the procedures used but upon the price obtained. In
1933 the legislature enacted a law that permitted a debtor, through judicial
proceedings, to offset against a deficiency resulting from either a judicial or
nonjudicial foreclosure sale the amount by which the actual value of the land
sold exceeded the foreclosure sales price.60
Like the 1889 Act, the 1933 Act was challenged as an impairment of the
obligation of contracts as it was applied to deeds of trust and mortgages
entered into prior to the date of the Act. 61 In Langever v. Miller62 the Texas
Supreme Court sustained the challenge and declared that the 1933 Act was
an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of contracts. 63 The 1933
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Price v. Gulf At. Life Ins. Co., 621 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
60. Act of 1933, ch. 92, 1933 Tex. Gen. Laws 198, repealed by Rules of Civil Procedure
Acts 1939, ch. 25, 1939 Tex. Gen. Laws 201, § 1. Section 5 of the 1933 Act is instructive as to
the perceived evils that the Act was designed to eliminate:
Sec. 5. The fact that many honest, hard working and worthy city home owners
and farm owners are being foreclosed in these hard, stringent and depressed
times when their real estate is being bought in [sic] at foreclosure sales, in many
instances, at unconscionably low prices by mortgage holders and lien holders
who are securing deficiency judgments for the unpaid balance of the mortgage
or lien held against these property holders, thereby, harassing and embarrassing
honest, worthy people by hanging unwarranted judgments over their heads and
further depressing their spirits when calamity overtook them through no fault of
their own, creates an emergency and an imperative public necessity ....
Id. § 5.
61. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
62. 124 Tex. 80, 76 S.W.2d 1025 (1934).
63. Id. at 85-86, 76 S.W.2d at 1028. In so holding the court observed:
It is obvious that the legal effect of this act is to cancel all deficiency judgments
to the extent of the difference between the actual value of the property sold
under foreclosure and the amount which it may have brought at such sale, pro-
vided, of course, an action is brought by the judgment debtor for such purpose,
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Act was then repealed by the Texas Legislature three years later.
The 1933 Act was virtually identical to the legislation recently enacted by
the Texas Legislature in May, 1989, but vetoed by the Governor. The 1989
legislation began with Senate bill 1394, introduced by Senator Parker. Sen-
ate bill 1394 would have limited a deficiency judgment following a foreclo-
sure sale to the difference between the unpaid balance of the secured debt
and 70% of the fair market value of the land at the time the loan was
made.64 The stated purpose of Senate bill 1394 was to bring Texas in line
with other states that have anti-deficiency statutes, particularly in view of
the current downturn in the Texas real estate market. 65 Senate bill 1394
never emerged from committee. When Senate bill 452, a bill of technical
amendments to the Property Code, passed the Senate and was being consid-
ered by the House, however, an amendment to that bill was added which
required a lender to exhaust its remedies against the collateral for a loan
prior to bringing suit against any debtor of the secured loan. 66 The House
amendment to Senate bill 452 also prohibited a lender from seeking a defi-
ciency judgment against the debtor following a nonjudicial foreclosure
sale.67 The House passed Senate bill 452, as amended, on May 16, 1989.
When Senate bill 452, together with the House amendment, was returned to
the Senate, a Joint Conference Committee was created. 68 The Conference
Committee compromise, which was enacted by both houses, permitted a
debtor, in an action by the lender to recover a deficiency judgment, to prove
that the fair market value of the land sold exceeded the sales price obtained
at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale.69 To the extent the debtor was able to es-
tablish that the fair market value of the land exceeded the sales price ob-
tained, the debtor would then have been entitled to offset the deficiency "by
and the necessary proof of value made. In the case of sales under deeds of trust
without judicial foreclosure, the effect is the same, since the purpose of the law is
to deny recovery of a deficiency judgment for any amount of the debt in satisfac-
tion of which the sale under the deed of trust or mortgage may have taken place.
Id. The position of the Texas Supreme Court in Langever was somewhat more strict than that
of other states' courts in ruling on the constitutionality of similar depression era legislation
limiting deficiency judgments. See, e.g., Kresos v. White, 47 Ariz. 175, 54 P.2d 800 (1936);
Atlantic Loan Co. v. Peterson, 181 Ga. 266, 182 S.E. 15 (1935); Klinke v. Samuels, 269 N.Y.
144, 190 N.E. 324 (1934); Beaver County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Winowich, 363 Pa. 483, 187
A. 481 (1936); Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Garrison, 185 S.C. 255, 193 S.E. 308 (1937);
Citizens Mut. Bldg. Ass'n, Inc. v. Edwards, 67 Va. 399, 189 S.E. 453 (1937); see also Rich-
mond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 300 U.S. 124 (1937) (North
Carolina statute limiting deficiency judgments is not contrary to United States constitutional
protection against statutory impairment of contract obligation).
64. Tex. S.B. 1394, 71st Leg. (1989). The Durrett 70% rule appears to have influenced
the formulation of this legislation. Even at its most extreme, however, the Durrett 70% rule
never suggested that the appropriate time for judging value was the time the deed of trust was
executed rather than the time the foreclosure occurred.
65. Id., Legislative Initiative (Bill Summary).
66. Kilday, Texas House Approves Foreclosure Law Change, Dallas Morning News, May
17, 1989, at IA, col. 1.
67. Tex. S.B. 452, 71st Leg. (1989) (House Amendment No. 2).
68. Stutz, Senate Rejects Foreclosure Changes, Dallas Morning News, May 20, 1989, at
43A, col. 1.
69. See Tex. S.B. 452, 71st Leg. (1989) (as enacted; later vetoed).
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the amount by which the fair market value exceed[ed] such sales price."'70
Although it was widely thought that the Conference Committee compromise
had the support of both consumer and lender groups, 71 the Governor vetoed
the bill on the day before the bill would have otherwise become law without
his signature. 72
While some legislators are apparently trying to revive this bill, the authors
believe that a more comprehensive approach is required to lessen the per-
ceived inequities of nonjudicial foreclosure procedures in Texas. That ap-
proach will be discussed in detail in section III of this Article. Because
bankruptcy laws also have a significant influence on nonjudicial foreclosure
sales, section II of this Article examines the impact on a foreclosure sale of
the fraudulent conveyance provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
II. THE NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE SALE AS A FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCE
A. Early Development of Fraudulent Conveyance Laws
Like the laws governing powers of sale, laws regarding fraudulent convey-
ances apparently existed under Roman law.73 Slow acceptance of the power
of sale in the English courts, however, does not parallel the early acceptance
of fraudulent conveyance principles in England.74 The Statute of Elizabeth,
enacted in the English Parliament in 1570, is frequently referred to as the
basis for the fraudulent conveyance laws adopted in this country.7"
In their earliest form, fraudulent conveyance laws were designed to pro-
tect creditors from a debtor's intentional action in placing his property be-
yond a creditor's reach. 76 Although actual intent to defraud may have been
the original test for determining whether a conveyance was fraudulent, the
courts soon recognized certain fact patterns as "presumptively indicative of
fraudulent intent." 77 These fact patterns, or badges of fraud, included the
existence of pending suits, the transfer of all property subject to execution,
and any transfers to relatives, especially when any of these transfers were
made without fair consideration. 78
In response to the increasing use of presumptive intent based on certain
badges of fraud, the original version of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act, as approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
70. Id.
71. Slater, Foreclosure Law Accord Reached, Dallas Morning News, May 26, 1989, at 1A,
col. 1.
72. Slater, Clements Vetoes Bill on Foreclosure, Dallas Morning News, June 19, 1989, at
IA, col. 1.
73. Comment, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales, supra note 13, at 389.
74. See id. at 390.
75. See, e.g., id. at 389; Alden, Gross & Borowitz, supra note 8, at 1605; Castanares, supra
note 9, at 518.
76. See Alden, Gross & Borowitz, supra note 8, at 1605.
77. Comment, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales, supra note 13, at 391.
78. See, e.g., Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 52-53 (Tex. 1964); Shearon v.
Henderson, 38 Tex. 245, 246 (1873); Adams v. Wilhite, 636 S.W.2d 851, 856 (Tex. App.-
Tyler), rev'd on other grounds, 640 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. 1982).
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State Laws in 1918, required that the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a
creditor as the result of a transfer of a debtor's property must be "actual
intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law."'79 Nevertheless, cer-
tain transactions that had been branded by the courts as evidencing pre-
sumptive intent to defraud remained fraudulent conveyances even without
the requisite actual intent.80 Section 4 of the original version of the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act provided that "[e]very conveyance made and
every obligation incurred by a person who is or will be thereby rendered
insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors without regard to his actual intent if
the conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred without a fair consider-
ation."'' 8 This approach was adopted in section 67(d) of the Bankruptcy Act
in 1938.82 Thereafter, in 1978, section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code super-
seded section 67(d) of the Bankruptcy Act. 3
B. Foreclosure Sales as Fraudulent Conveyances
Despite the continuous existence of some form of fraudulent conveyance
provisions in the bankruptcy laws of this country since the early 1800S, 84
those provisions do not appear to have been applied to set aside a foreclosure
sale prior to the Fifth Circuit's holding in Durrett.8 5 Indeed, Durrett has
been widely criticized both for its holding that a foreclosure sale constituted
a transfer subject to review as a fraudulent conveyance and its presumed
holding that a sales price of less than 70% of the fair market value of the
property was not fair consideration.8 6
The concept that a nonjudicial foreclosure sale is a transfer subject to re-
view under section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code was first challenged in
Alsop v. Alaska (In re Alsop),87 a decision by a bankruptcy court in the Dis-
trict of Alaska. While acknowledging that a nonjudicial foreclosure sale
may constitute a transfer pursuant to the definition of transfer set forth in
section 101(40) (now section 101(50)) of the Bankruptcy Code, the court
noted that the time when a transfer is deemed to have occurred for the pur-
poses of section 548 is determined by reference to the special definitional
provisions set forth in section 548(d)(1).88 Section 548(d)(1) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code states that a transfer is deemed to have occurred when it "is so
perfected [in the transferee] that a bona fide purchaser from the debtor
against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected cannot
acquire an interest in the property transferred that is superior to the interest
79. UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 7, 7A U.L.A. 509 (1918); Comment,
Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales, supra note 13, at 392.
80. See Castanares, supra note 9, at 522; Roberts & Mariarty, supra note 9, at 583.
81. UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 4; 7A U.L.A. 474 (1918).
82. Comment, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales, supra note 13, at 392.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 390.
85. See Davis & Standiford, supra note 9, at 204; Simpson, supra note 9, at 75.
86. See, e.g., Coppell & Kahn, supra note 5; Simpson, supra note 9; Zinman, Houle &
Weiss, supra note 9.
87. 14 Bankr. 982 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), affd, 22 Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982).
88. 14 Bankr. at 986.
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[of the transferee]."'8 9 According to the court in Alsop, federal law deter-
mines whether a transfer occurred, but "[s]tate law determines the time and
method of perfection." 90 Because Alaska law provided that the title of a
purchaser at a foreclosure sale "relates back to the time of the execution of
the deed of trust," 91 the court held that the transfer resulting from a foreclo-
sure sale was perfected and therefore deemed to have occurred as of the time
the original deed of trust was recorded. 92 In other words, because, under
state law, no one acquiring an interest in the property from the debtor after
the recording of the deed of trust could have acquired an interest superior to
a purchaser at a foreclosure sale conducted pursuant to that deed of trust,
the transfer accomplished through a foreclosure sale was deemed to have
occurred, for the purposes of section 548, as of the date of the recording of
that deed of trust.
While the basic rationale of Alsop was followed by the Ninth Circuit in
Madrid v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. (In re Madrid)93 and supported by
the Sixth Circuit in In re Winshal Settlor's Trust,94.that rationale is flawed. 95
The purpose of section 548(d)(1) was "to prevent a secret 'transfer' by post-
poning the commencement of the fraudulent conveyance period until the
transferee [took] the necessary steps under state law to perfect (by recording,
possession, or otherwise) its interest against a subsequent bona fide pur-
chaser dealing with the debtor."' 96 Section 548(d)(1) does not limit the
number of transfers of an interest of the debtor in the land that may be
possible in a mortgage transaction.9 7 In Texas, as in most states,98 no trans-
fer of title to land occurs upon the execution of a deed of trust; rather, the
interest of the debtor transferred pursuant to the deed of trust is simply a
lien that is subject to foreclosure upon the default of the debtor.99 Actual
title to the land is only transferred at the time of the foreclosure, when the
trustee executes and delivers a deed to the purchaser on behalf of the
debtor.10° Although a foreclosure sale may extinguish all encumbrances
junior to the lien of the deed of trust, so that the purchaser's title to the land
is said to relate back to the recording of the deed of trust, that fact cannot
support the conclusion that a mortgage foreclosure transaction constitutes
89. 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(1) (1988).
90. 14 Bankr. at 986.
91. Id. (quoting Alaska Laborers Training Fund v. P&R Enter., 583 P.2d 825, 826-27
(Alaska 1978)).
92. Id.
93. 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984); see also Calairo v. Pitts-
burgh Nat'l Bank (In re Ewing), 36 Bankr. 476 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 746 F.2d 1465 (3d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985) ("transfer" of pledged securities occurred when
creditor perfected security interest under state law by taking possession, not when securities
were later foreclosed).
94. 758 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1985).
95. See Madrid, 725 F.2d at 1204 (concurring opinion).
96. Ehrlich, supra note 13, at 939 n.17.
97. Id. at 940.
98. Id. at 940 n.20.




only a single transfer.' 01
In 1984, the Bankruptcy Code was amended to include within the defini-
tion of transfer the foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption. 0 2 The
Bankruptcy Code was also amended to add the word "involuntarily" to the
types of transfers by the debtor that may be avoided under section 548(a). 10 3
While some courts and commentators have interpreted these amendments as
a rejection of the Alsop and Madrid rationale, 1°4 it is not certain that these
amendments accomplished that result. 105 Indeed, neither Alsop nor Madrid
challenged the concept that a transfer occurred as a result of a foreclosure
sale; rather, both Madrid and Alsop questioned the effective date of such
transfer pursuant to section 548(d)(1). The language of section 548(d)(1) has
not been amended so as to resolve the timing issue raised by Madrid and
Alsop. The vast majority of the courts considering the transfer issue, how-
ever, have rejected the rationale of Madrid and Alsop in favor of Durrett. 0 6
For the Texas practitioner, moreover, the transfer issue is, in fact, not an
issue at all, because Durrett has been consistently followed in the bankruptcy
courts in Texas. 0 7
C. Determining Reasonably Equivalent Value in a Nonjudicial
Foreclosure Sale
Clearly the most controversial holding in Durrett did not relate to the
transfer issue, but to the fair consideration, or now, under the Bankruptcy
Code, reasonably equivalent value, issue. Section 67(d)(1)(e) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act did not define consideration but did set forth the conditions mak-
ing consideration fair.'08 Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, on the other
101. See Ehrlich, supra note 13, at 940; see also First Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Bismark Inc. v.
Hulm (In re Hulm), 738 F.2d 323, 327 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984) (distinctly
separate transfers of interest in real property may occur at different times). As stated by the
bankruptcy court in Pruitt v. Gramaton Investors Corp. (In re Pruitt), 72 Bankr. 436, 443-44
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987):
At the time of the creation of a mortgage, certain of the debtor's rights are
transferred to the mortgagee, while others are retained. The transferred rights
are security interests which generally do not ripen into possessory interests until
a default occurs. Retained rights generally include the rights of enjoyment and
the right to redeem the property from the lien of the security transaction upon
payment of the obligation secured thereby .... A foreclosure terminates the
mortgagor's rights and transfers to the purchaser all of the property rights in the
premises.
Id. (citations omitted).
102. 11 U.S.C. § 101(50) (1988) (formerly 11 U.S.C. § 101(48) (1984)).
103. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988).
104. See Pruitt v. Gramaton Inv. Corp. (In re Pruitt), 72 Bankr. 436, 442 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1987); Comment, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales, supra note 13, at 401.
105. See Weintraub & Resnick, supra note 9.
106. Ehrlich, supra note 13, at 940 n.21 (cases therein cited represent majority position).
107. See, e.g., Jackson v. Security Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Jackson), 76 Bankr. 597
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987); Willis v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. (In re Willis), 48 Bankr.
295 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985); Coleman v. Home Sav. Ass'n (In re Coleman), 21 Bankr. 832
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982); see also Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547, 549
(5th Cir. 1981) (broad statutory definition of transfer includes nonjudicial foreclosure sale),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982).
108. Section 67(d)(1)(e) stated:
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hand, defines value, 10 9 but does not define reasonably equivalent. In any
event, the change in language from section 67(d) of the Bankruptcy Act to
section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code does not appear to have had any
appreciable impact on the approach of the courts in determining whether the
price obtained at a foreclosure sale was sufficient when such a sale otherwise
met the test of a fraudulent conveyance by occurring within one year prior to
the bankruptcy filing and at a time when the debtor was insolvent. 110 In that
regard, commentators have identified three differing approaches by the
courts in determining whether a reasonably equivalent value was obtained at
a foreclosure sale. 1 1
The first approach is the so-called 70% rule, derived from the statement in
Durrett that the court had been unable to locate any case upholding a sale of
real property for less than 70% of its fair market value.' 12 Despite the fact
that the holding of Durrett was founded on the court's conclusion, based
upon all of the evidence, that "the price which [the purchaser] paid for the
property at the trustee's sale was not a 'fair equivalent' for the property,"1 13
many courts have nevertheless viewed Durrett as having created a general
rule 14 or presumption1 15 that a sale for less than 70% of fair market value is
not a reasonably equivalent value. 116 In other words, according to this ap-
proach, federal law has superimposed a minimum bid or upset price on state
foreclosure law, whereby any purchase of property' through a foreclosure
sale for less than 70% of its appraised value is voidable in bankruptcy if the
other elements of fraudulent transfer are present.1 17
Regardless of the fact that Durrett did not create a 70% rule, valid argu-
ments favor its application to the question of reasonably equivalent value in
the context of a foreclosure sale. Assuming a lender could rely upon an
appraisal conducted prior to the foreclosure sale, application of a mathemat-
consideration given for the property or obligation of a debtor is "fair" (1) when,
in good faith, in exchange and as a fair equivalent therefor, property is trans-
ferred or an antecedent debt is satisfied, or (2) when such property or obligation
is received in good faith to secure a present advance or antecedent debt in an
amount not disproportionately small as compared with the value of the property
or obligation obtained.
11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(1)(e) (1978) (repealed 1979) (emphasis supplied).
109. Section 548(d)(2)(A) states: " '[V]alue' means property, or satisfaction or securing of
a present or antecedent debt of the debtor, but does not include an unperformed promise to
furnish support to the debtor or to a relative of the debtor." 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(d)(2)(A)
(1988).
110. See Comment, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales, supra note 13, at 405.
111. See, e.g., id.; Alden, Gross & Borowitz, supra note 8; Cohn, supra note 9.
112. Cohn, supra note 9, at 273; Comment, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales, supra note 13,
at 405.
113. 621 F.2d at 204.
114. Wickham v. United Am. Bank (In re Thompson), 18 Bankr. 67, 70 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1982).
115. Berge v. Sweet (In re Berge), 33 Bankr. 642, 649-50 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983).
116. Cohn, supra note 9, at 273. See Jackson v. Security Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In re
Jackson), 76 Bankr. 587, 599 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987); Pelican Homestead v. Wooten (In re
Gabel), 61 Bankr. 661, 667-68 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1985); Willis v. Borg-Warner Acceptance
Corp. (In re Willis), 48 Bankr. 295, 300-01 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985).
117. See Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Wheeler (In re Wheeler), 34 Bankr. 818, 821
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983).
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ical 70% formula would promote certainty. 118 Moreover, as observed by the
court in Jackson v. Security Federal Savings & Loan Association (In re Jack-
son),"l9 even if appraisals differ, the 70% rule provides a 30% cushion that
"give[s] the purchaser at foreclosure some discount for the risks of making a
purchase at such a sale in addition to eliminating minor differences of opin-
ion as to fair market value."'120 As some commentators have observed, how-
ever, if the determination of reasonably equivalent value was intended by
Congress to be based solely upon the application of a mathematical formula,
"Congress would hardly have asked courts to determine whether the consid-
eration was 'fair,' as it did in the Bankruptcy Act, or 'reasonably equivalent,'
as it does in the Bankruptcy Code. The terms 'fair' and 'reasonable' mean
that the trial judge or jury is to evaluate the case in light of all material facts
and circumstances."' 12
1
The decision by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit in
Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid),122 represents the
second and much more certain approach to the issue of reasonable equiva-
lence in the context of foreclosure sales. That approach, simply, is to recog-
nize that the price obtained "at a non-collusive and regularly conducted
foreclosure sale should be conclusively presumed to be a reasonably
equivalent value for the property sold." 123 The court justified this approach
by pointing out that it caused state foreclosure law, under which the mere
inadequacy of price would not invalidate a sale, to "be harmonized with" the
fraudulent conveyance provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 124 While this ap-
proach is consistent with the revised Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act,' 25 it effectively allows state foreclosure law to override the requirements
of section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. 12 6 Regardless of state law policies
118. See Comment, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales, supra note 13, at 406.
119. 76 Bankr. 597 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).
120. Id. at 599.
121. Davis & Standiford, supra note 9, at 225-26.
122. 21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir.), aff'd, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
833 (1984).
123. Comment, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales, supra note 13, at 397.
124. 21 Bankr. at 427.
125. Pursuant to the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, adopted in Texas in 1987, a
regularly conducted, non-collusive foreclosure sale cannot be challenged based upon the price
obtained. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.004 (Vernon 1987). A person acquiring land
at such a sale is deemed to have given "a reasonably equivalent value," regardless of the actual
sales price. Id. § 24.004(b).
126. The dissenting judge in the Bankruptcy Panel's decision in Lawyers Title Insurance
Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid) noted:
The Bankruptcy Code is a federal statute. Section 548 states a standard with
respect to reviewing consideration in the event of a transfer of the debtor's prop-
erty. Section 548 transcends the dispute between this debtor and the secured
creditor. It brings into focus the claims of the debtor's other creditors that they
have been deprived of recourse to an asset by an improvident sale. The majority
would hold that despite widespread differences in law and practices relating to
foreclosure, no bankruptcy court may entertain the factual issue of whether,
under § 548, the consideration paid was the reasonably equivalent value. By
concluding that a regularly conducted sale in the absence of collusion satisfies
the "reasonably equivalent value" test, the majority has excised vital language
from § 548 in order to create an exception to the statute where a forced sale of
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for upholding foreclosure sales despite an inadequacy of price, the Bank-
ruptcy Code has its own distinct policies respecting the preservation of the
debtor's estate for unsecured creditors, which policy may require the setting
aside of a particular foreclosure sale despite compliance with state law
procedures. 127
The third approach to the issue of reasonably equivalent value is the case-
by-case analysis that is suggested by the language of section 548(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code, which approach requires a review of the facts and circum-
stances of each foreclosure sale in determining whether reasonable equiva-
lence has been obtained. 128 Courts that have endorsed the case-by-case
approach have generally recognized that a forced sale inevitably results in a
price that is less than fair market value. 129 After all, fair market value is
"the amount of money that a person desiring to sell, but not bound to do so,
could, within a reasonable time, procure for such property from a person
who desires and is able to buy, but is not bound to purchase the prop-
erty." 30 Because a foreclosing lender is compelled to sell, that fact changes
the basic assumptions underlying the ordinary determination of fair market
value. Consequently, the fact of a forced sale should be taken into account
in defining reasonable equivalence. Indeed, "[a] price that might be unrea-
sonably low in the context of an arm's-length sale might be reasonable in the
context of a forced sale."13'
Taking into account the fact of a forced sale, however, does not necessar-
ily mean that a particular court must accept the state's foreclosure proce-
dures in determining reasonable equivalence. To do so would be to adopt
the conclusive presumption approach offered by the Bankruptcy Panel's de-
cision in Madrid or a rebuttable presumption test that compared a particular
foreclosure sale with the results achieved at the average foreclosure sale con-
the debtor's property is involved. There is nothing in the Code nor its legislative
history to suggest that such an exception was intended.
21 Bankr. at 428 (Volinn, J., dissenting).
127. See Davis & Standiford, supra note 9, at 228.
128. For example, the court in Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23
Bankr. 434 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) noted:
Although Durrett has been so interpreted, Durrett does not hold that reasonably
equivalent value must be 70 percent or more of fair market value. Durrett held
that on the facts of the case, 57.7 percent of fair market value was not a fair
equivalent. Naturally, reasonable equivalence will depend on the facts of each
case.
Id. at 448.
129. Alden, Gross & Borowitz, supra note 8, at 1613; Davis & Standiford, supra note 9, at
230.
130. West Tex. Hotel Co. v. City of El Paso, 83 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1935, writ dism'd); accord State v. Carpenter, 126 Tex. 604, 89 S.W.2d 979, 980 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1936, opinion adopted). See generally Comment, Fair Market Value.- A Primer for Texas
Legal Practice, 15 TEX. TECH L. REv. 637 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, Fair Market Value]
(providing basic understanding of definition of and approaches to valuation). For a thoughtful
discussion of the difficulties posed under alternative methods of real property valuation that
are available in bankruptcy court in a case where foreclosure had not occurred, see In re
Raylin Dev. Co. (No. 88-1221), 3 Tex. Bankr. Ct. Rptr. 490 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. June 30, 1989)
(order on motion for valuation of assets).
131. Davis & Standiford, supra note 9, at 230.
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ducted pursuant to state law. 132 As previously observed, however, it is ac-
cepted by virtually everyone that even a properly conducted nonjudicial
foreclosure sale in Texas simply does not promote competitive bidding or
otherwise result in the maximization of price, even giving due regard to the
circumstances of a forced sale. As one commentator has observed, Durrett's
attack on "the adequacy of prices received under current methods of foreclo-
sure ... [simply reinforces our own] basic instincts as to the overall short-
comings of current foreclosure practices."' 33 Accordingly, the proper
application of the case-by-case approach must focus not upon the price ob-
tained in the factual context of foreclosure but upon the adequacy of state
foreclosure procedures.' 34
In Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 35 for example, the Seventh Circuit
focused its review of a state foreclosure sale on the procedures employed
rather than simply upon the price obtained. While the Seventh Circuit did
not clearly articulate the standard for reviewing procedures to determine
reasonable equivalence, the court did direct bankruptcy courts within its ju-
risdiction to consider each foreclosure sale to determine "whether the proce-
dures employed were calculated not only to secure for the mortgagee the
value of its interest but also to return to the debtor-mortgagor his equity in
the property." 136 This examination was to include consideration of such fac-
tors as whether there was a fair appraisal of the property, whether the prop-
erty sale was widely advertised, and whether competitive bidding had been
encouraged. 37
A recent bankruptcy court opinion from California illustrates the method-
ology embodied in the procedural approach suggested by Bundles. In Lind-
say v. Beneficial Reinsurance Co. (In re Lindsay) 38 the court reviewed a
Texas foreclosure sale to determine whether reasonable equivalence had
been obtained under section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. 139 Acknowledg-
ing the essential correctness of the Seventh Circuit's Bundles approach, the
132. Id.
133. Comment, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales, supra note 13, at 412.
134. See Ehrlich, supra note 13, at 936. As stated by this commentator:
If a foreclosure sale conducted under state mandated conditions really did effec-
tuate a competitive bidding market for the property, the price bid at the sale
would be an excellent and realistic indication of reasonably equivalent value
under the circumstances. The policies embodied in Section 548(a)(2) permit an
interpretation that reasonable equivalence in the context of a forced sale will
frequently be less than what might be received at a private sale with optimal
time to market the property and negotiate a higher price. The state interest in
assuring mortgagees an expeditious and final opportunity to resort to the mort-
gaged property justifies some unavoidable reduction in value at the forced fore-
closure sale. The bankruptcy trustee, however, should be allowed to show that
even a noncollusive foreclosure sale has failed to bring a reasonably equivalent
price, even under the circumstances of a forced sale, because the state-mandated
procedure is intrinsically defective and has caused imperfect market results.
Id. at 960-61.
135. 856 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1988).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 98 Bankr. 983 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989).
139. Although the court was sitting in the Ninth Circuit and was therefore bound to follow
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court adopted a three-part test for determining reasonable equivalence in the
foreclosure context. The first step was to determine whether the procedures
used in conducting the foreclosure sale complied with applicable state law. If
the procedures used were in compliance with state law, then the second step
was to determine whether those procedures provided minimum standards of
commercial reasonableness so as to assure a bid-in price that was a fair
equivalent of the value of collateral in the context of a forced sale. If the
court concluded that the procedures followed were commercially reasonable
in the context of a forced sale, then the inquiry ended, and no basis for
avoiding the sale arose. On the other hand, to the extent it is determined
that the procedures were not commercially reasonable, the court must con-
sider the third part of the test-whether the price obtained was less than
could have been obtained if commercially reasonable procedures were fol-
lowed. Not surprisingly, although current Texas procedures had been fol-
lowed by the lender in Lindsay, the court concluded that those procedures
failed the second part of the court's three-part test-technical compliance
with Texas law did not result in a commercially reasonable sale.' 4 0
While the courts applying this approach do not appear to have clearly
articulated the standards to be employed in reviewing foreclosure sale proce-
dures to determine reasonable equivalence, and while the bankruptcy courts
in the Fifth Circuit appear to continue to vacillate between a case-by-case
analysis and a strict application of the 70% rule, 141 the authors believe that
the foregoing procedural analysis, which echoes that of other commenta-
tors, 142 is sound. If the procedures employed in a foreclosure sale permit the
sale to be conducted in a manner that allows market forces to work to the
maximum extent possible, the price realized at such a sale is clearly the best
indicator of the value of the land in the context of a forced sale. 143 Substitut-
ing an appraiser's opinion as to reasonably equivalent value merely results in
the court looking to find what an imaginary buyer will pay an imaginary
seller under unreal conditions, rather than finding what a real buyer and
seller do in real circumstances. 144 While being as "well informed as possi-
ble," an appraiser's opinion of value is, after all, merely a guess.145 Accord-
ingly, to the extent state foreclosure procedures could be improved so as
actually to promote competitive bidding, the sales price obtained at a sale
conducted pursuant to these procedures would indeed be the best evidence of
reasonably equivalent value in the context of a foreclosure sale.
146
Madrid, the court concluded, incorrectly in the authors' view, that the enactment of the bank-
ruptcy amendments in 1984 overruled Madrid.
140. 98 Bankr. at 987.
141. Compare Coleman v. Home Say. Ass'n (In re Coleman), 21 Bankr. 832 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1982) (following case-by-case approach) with In re Marble, 40 Bankr. 751 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1984) (adhering to strict application of Durrett).
142. See Ehrlich, supra note 13; Comment, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales, supra note 13.
143. Ehrlich, supra note 13, at 966.
144. Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 443 n.12
(Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
145. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 6 (1949); see also Comment, Fair
Market Value, supra note 130 (discussing three basic methods of valuation).
146. Ehrlich, supra note 13, at 980. The authors acknowledge that where there is no mar-
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The Fifth Circuit, although continuing to adhere to Durrett,14 7 discour-
ages bankruptcy filings that are made solely to avoid the perceived inequities
of state foreclosure law.' 48 The adoption by the Fifth Circuit of the ap-
proach taken by the courts in Bundles and Lindsay, coupled with the enact-
ment of Texas legislation establishing a foreclosure mechanism that would
better assure fair foreclosure sales, however, might relieve the federal judici-
ary from the necessity of frequently reviewing foreclosure sale prices in
bankruptcy. If the foreclosure procedures actually used in conducting a sale
are found to have been designed to achieve the highest price possible in the
context of a forced sale, reasonable equivalence, in the authors' view, should
be conclusively presumed to have been achieved in connection with a fore-
closure sale conducted pursuant to those procedures, regardless of the actual
price obtained or its relationship to fair market value. Moreover, emphasiz-
ing the procedures used over the price obtained can be reconciled to Dur-
rett's actual rather than its presumed holding (the so called 70% rule) and
with the policies underlying section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. 149 Thus,
to improve the fundamental fairness of Texas nonjudicial foreclosure proce-
dures and to anticipate or encourage the Fifth Circuit's adoption of the Bun-
dles and Lindsay approach to the determination of reasonable equivalence in
the review of foreclosure sales under section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code,
the authors recommend several changes in Texas law.
III. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO TEXAS NONJUDICIAL
FORECLOSURE PROCEDURES
The following discussion proposes some modifications to the Texas nonju-
dicial foreclosure procedures designed to allow ordinary market forces to
work to the largest extent possible in the context of a forced sale. Although
the authors would encourage the bankruptcy courts to endorse these proce-
dures, the authors believe that these procedures will be beneficial to debtors
and creditors regardless of whether the bankruptcy courts recognize the use
of these procedures as necessarily achieving reasonable equivalence under
section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.
A. Defining the Problem
Although it is common to think of the trustee under a deed of trust as
acting solely as the lender's agent in conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure
ket, as has been the case recently in Texas, this statement would be viewed as patently untrue
by the borrower who is convinced that given enough time and proper marketing of his prop-
erty, the borrower will not only be able to repay the lender, but will also recover his equity.
Unfortunately, as indicated in Section III, real estate values fluctuate and must be determined
by exposure to the market (or lack thereof) as it exists at that time.
147. Wheless Drilling v. Bennett (In re Emerald Oil Co.), 807 F.2d 1234, 1238 n.6 (5th Cir.
1987).
148. See Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp. v. Louisiana Nat'l Bank (In re Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp.),
881 F.2d 1346, 1350 (5th Cir. 1989); Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp.
(In re Little Creek Dev. Co.), 779 F.2d 1068, 1074 (5th Cir. 1986).
149. Ehrlich, supra note 13, at 966.
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sale, a fairly well defined body of law in Texas obligates the trustee to act in
the best interests of both the mortgagor and the mortgagee in obtaining the
highest price possible for the property.1 50 Unfortunately, the existing proce-
dures mandated by section 52.001 of the Texas Property Code provide inad-
equate tools for the trustee to carry out his duty to the debtor and secured
creditor.
A public auction after only twenty-one days prior notice is not the cus-
tomary manner for marketing real estate. Real estate transactions, particu-
larly those involving commercial land, are normally the subject of intensely
negotiated contracts providing for title review, physical inspection, and war-
ranties. Even if third party bidders appear at a public sale, the trustee at a
nonjudicial foreclosure sale conducted pursuant to current law has no ability
to condition a sale upon the purchaser's satisfactory review of the title to and
physical condition of the property, nor does the trustee have the right to
negotiate a customary contract of sale with the potential purchaser. Indeed,
under current Texas law:
One who bids upon property at a foreclosure sale does so at his peril. If
the trustee conducting the sale has no power or authority to offer the
property for sale, or if there is other defect or irregularity which would
render the foreclosure sale void, then the purchaser cannot acquire title
to the property. 15
This is so because neither the trustee nor the mortgagee warrant either their
authority to sell the property under the deed of trust or the title to the prop-
erty conveyed.152 The only warranty derived by a purchaser at a foreclosure
sale is one from the debtor on behalf of whom the trustee is conveying the
property, assuming, of course, that the trustee has followed the correct pro-
cedures so as to have the requisite authority to do so.
The extent to which this rule of caveat emptor can be carried is illustrated
by Truman v. Continental Savings Association (In re Niland),153 a Fifth Cir-
cuit opinion applying Texas law. In Niland a purchaser acquired a house by
being the highest bidder at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale conducted in com-
pliance with state law and under the terms of a deed of trust executed by the
debtor. Nevertheless, the debtor was able successfully to set aside the sale at
a later date, because the property covered by the deed of trust was the
debtor's homestead and the debt secured by the deed of trust had not been
incurred for the constitutionally prescribed purposes. Moreover, although
the purchaser had paid cash to the trustee at the sale, which had been ap-
plied by the trustee to the payment of the debt, the court held that the pur-
chaser had no right to recover his purchase price from the creditor. Rather,
under established Texas law, the only remedy of a purchaser at a void fore-
150. See Hammonds v. Holmes, 559 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. 1977); First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Sharp, 359 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Tex. 1962); see also W. BAGGETr, supra note 22, § 2.64.
151. Henke v. First S. Properties, Inc., 586 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
152. Diversified, Inc. v. Walker, 702 S.W.2d 717, 723 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
153. 825 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1987).
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closure sale is to be equitably subrogated to the debt and lien of the credi-
tor. 154 Because the lien was invalid as a result of the homestead designation
of the property, the purchaser was effectively subrogated to an unsecured
note enforceable against a debtor then in bankruptcy.' 55
In addition, the purchaser could not sue the lender because, as previously
noted, the only warranty given by a trustee at a foreclosure sale is one given
on behalf of the debtor.' 5 6 As a result, the creditor received the benefit of
the purchaser's cash payment, the debtor had his exempt homestead re-
turned to him, and the purchaser was left with a claim against a debtor in a
no asset case. Recognizing the somewhat inequitable result, the court never-
theless noted that the purchaser took a risk that inheres in all nonjudicial
foreclosure sales in Texas.157
Existing statutory procedures are therefore not designed either to attract
interested buyers or to allow truly interested buyers to conduct basic due
diligence in connection with the purchase. Moreover, those purchasers who
are attracted to current foreclosure sales must essentially part with cash
without any assurance that the trustee has the authority to sell, that is, that a
default has occurred and that the statutory requirements have been ob-
served. Is it any wonder that there is rarely any competitive bidding at fore-
closure sales in Texas? Rather than penalize the lender for the inadequacies
of existing foreclosure procedures by adopting anti-deficiency or one-action
statutes, however, the authors believe that a few minor additions to the ex-
isting state procedures could substantially increase the attractiveness of a
foreclosure sale to potential purchasers.
B. Proposing the Solution-Suggested Changes to the Existing Nonjudicial
Foreclosure Process in Texas
The Uniform Land Transaction Act (ULTA), 158 adopted by the National
154. Id. at 813.
155. Id. at 814.
156. According to the court:
In conformity with the lien theory, a foreclosure sale transfers legal title from
the owner of the mortgaged property to the purchaser at the foreclosure sale.
The title never vests in the creditor, and the foreclosure deed is not a conveyance
from the trustee or the creditor to the purchaser. In executing the foreclosure
deed, the trustee does no more than effect the transfer of title from the debtor to
the foreclosure purchaser. It follows that the warranty contained in the trustee's
deed in this case does not bind the [trustee or the lender] but binds only the
[debtor].
Id. (citing Sandel v. Burney, 714 S.W.2d 40, 41 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ)).
157. Had [the purchaser] purchased the property from [the debtor], he would have
obtained a warranty deed and no homestead issue would have arisen. Instead,
thinking that he could obtain the property for less than it was worth, [the pur-
chaser] purchased at the foreclosure sale. He was able to obtain the property at
a good price, but, under Texas law, he risked the possibility that there would be
a failure of title, as in fact there was. We do not think that a Texas court would
protect [the purchaser] in this situation, and we decline to do so.
Id. at 813.
158. 13 U.L.A. 476 (1986). The authors are aware that article 3 of the ULTA has been
revised and adopted as the Uniform Land Security Interest Act. Because the authors are not
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Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1975, provides a
ready reference for improvements to the Texas nonjudicial foreclosure pro-
cess. The authors' observations at a few foreclosure sales, as well as the
work of other commentators,1 59 provide an additional reference. Accord-
ingly, the authors suggest the following statutory alterations to existing
Texas foreclosure procedures.
1. Apply The Good Faith Purchaser for Value Concept to Nonjudicial
Foreclosure Sales
The good faith purchaser for value doctrine is inapplicable to a "void"
foreclosure sale. 160 In other words, even a purchaser who pays valuable con-
sideration in good faith and without notice of any defects in the foreclosure
process or any lack of authority of the trustee to act is subject to having the
apparent title he acquires at the foreclosure sale set aside by subsequent ac-
tions. 161 The authors believe that, in balancing the equities, a third party
purchaser who acquires title from a trustee duly appointed by a recorded
instrument executed by the secured creditor in accordance with the terms of
the deed of trust, and who is without notice of any defect in the deed of trust,
should be entitled to acquire title to the property free of subsequent claims of
the mortgagor questioning the authority of the trustee to sell the property.
To that end, the authors propose that the Texas Legislature adopt a provi-
sion similar to § 3-511 of the ULTA. Section 3-511 of the ULTA provides,
in pertinent part:
(a) If real estate is sold by a creditor under a power of sale ... a good
faith purchaser for value acquires the debtor's and creditor's rights in
the real estate, free of the security interest under which the sale oc-
curred and any subordinate interest, even though the creditor or person
conducting the sale fails to comply with the requirements of this Part
on default .... 162
To the extent that the foreclosure was improper, the aggrieved mortgagor
urging adoption of either act in Texas, we trust that the readers will indulge our reference to
the older act.
159. See Washburn, The Judicial and Legislative Response to Price Inadequacy in Mortgage
Foreclosure Sales, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 843 (1980).
160. Henke v. First S. Properties, Inc., 586 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
161. See Slaughter v. Quails, 162 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1942). If, however, the trustee has
authority but fails to observe the prescribed procedures, chills the bid, or otherwise acts in a
manner that gives rise to an equitable right in the debtor to set aside the sale, that equitable
right can be avoided by a good faith purchaser for value. See Dillard v. Broyles, 633 S.W.2d
636, 644 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
162. UNIFORM LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 3-511(a), 13 U.L.A. 476, 619 (1975) [herein-
after ULTA]. The official comments to § 3-511 of the ULTA explain that the section:
is intended to eliminate the necessity of a rigorous examination to determine
whether the foreclosure transaction complies with the statutory requirements in
meticulous detail. The purpose of freeing the purchaser from the risk of the
faulty foreclosure is to further assure that the sales price at the foreclosure sale
will be more closely related to the real market value of the property thus liqui-




should be content with his action against the secured creditor for damages
arising from the wrongful foreclosure,1 63 unless he can show that the pur-
chaser failed to meet the test of a good faith purchaser for value. 164
Although the technical requirements of the good faith purchaser for value
doctrine do not apply when legal title never passed because the trustee's deed
was void, application of the doctrine to trustee's sales is justified when one
balances the equities of the innocent purchaser against the mortgagor who
executed the deed of trust and thus "made it possible for the trustee to create
the appearance of good title" in the purchaser. 65
2. Increase the Notice Period
While the twenty-one day period currently provided under Texas law is
clearly insufficient to adequately market real property, the authors recognize
that in some situations there is no time that would be long enough to ade-
quately market a given parcel of real estate. To increase the likelihood of a
foreclosure proceeding actually exposing a property to the market, however,
the authors propose that the notice period for a nonjudicial sale be increased
to sixty days. In that connection, the authors do not believe that the current
requirement that all sales occur on the first Tuesday of iach month or at the
courthouse steps of the county in which the property is located need be con-
tinued. Notices that clearly specify a date and place and otherwise comply
with the remaining procedures proposed herein should be sufficient. More-
over, by dispensing with the requirement that a sale only occur on the first
Tuesday of a month, the lengthening of the period is probably not that sig-
nificant to lenders. Under current practices, it can take almost sixty days to
foreclose after the occurrence of a default, simply because the default may
occur at a time when it is too late to give the required twenty-one days notice
for a sale on the first Tuesday of the next month.
3. Require Notice to Junior Lienholders and Owners of Record
Texas law generally does not require that a notice of sale be given to any
junior lienholder. 166 Moreover, there is technically no requirement that no-
tice be given to the owner of the land unless he is personally obligated on the
debt.' 67 The authors believe that notifying junior lienholders and owners of
163. See Charter Nat'l Bank-Houston v. Stevens, No. A14-88-00421-CV (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.], Oct. 26, 1989, n.w.h.) (not yet reported) (Westlaw, TX-CS,
DATABASE NO. 126319); Diversified, Inc. v. Gibraltar Say. Ass'n, 762 S.W.2d 620 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
164. See Williams v. Jennings, 755 S.W.2d 874, 882 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1988, no writ).
165. Slaughter v. Qualls, 139 Tex. 340, 346, 162 S.W.2d 671, 675 (1942); see also Phillips v.
Latham, 523 S.W.2d 19, 24 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Thurmond v.
International Harvester Co., 166 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1942, no writ).
166. Chandler v. Orgain, 302 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Tex. Civ. App.- Fort Worth 1957, no
writ); W. BAGGETr, supra note 22, § 2.45.
167. American Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Musick, 531 S.W.2d 581, 588 (Tex. 1975); Lawson v.
Gibbs, 591 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); W.
BAGGE-rr, supra note 22, § 2.39.
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any interests in the land subject to the debt would not impose an undue
burden on secured lenders and may result in an increased participation at
foreclosure sales. Clearly the more persons aware of the sale and actively
soliciting potential buyers the better. As in the requirements of section 3-
505(g) of ULTA, the authors believe that the requirement for notice to jun-
ior lienholders and other persons owning an interest in the land should be
limited to the debtor, mortgagor (if different from the debtor), and those
who recorded their liens or interests after the date of the recording of the
deed of trust and no less than a specified period prior to the date of the
foreclosure sale. Section 3-505(g) provides that the documents creating the
lien or interest must be recorded at least seven weeks before the sale. The
authors believe that thirty days is a sufficient period in light of the fact that
under existing practice a foreclosing lender must obtain a lien search thirty
days prior to the sale in order to give the proper notices to the Internal
Revenue Service to the extent the land has been encumbered by a federal tax
lien. 168
The trustee's obligation to give notices to junior lienholders and other in-
terest owners should be limited, however, to mailing notice to the addresses
specified in the documents filed of record to create such liens and interest.
This avoids the lender's concern that it may unintentionally be aware
(through other officers of the lender) of another address for a particular
party. In the event of a change of address, junior lienholders and other own-
ers of interest in the property can protect themselves by recording supple-
ment documents changing their addresses for notice.
4. Encourage the Use of Market Advertising
The concept that notice of a foreclosure is sufficient by mailing a copy to
the debtor, posting a copy at the courthouse door and filing a copy with the
county clerk is highly improbable. While the ULTA proposes a concept of
commercial reasonableness respecting notice and advertising similar to that
imposed by the Uniform Commercial Code and suggested by Bundles and
Lindsay, the authors suggest that certain minimum standards for required
advertising be clearly defined by the Texas Legislature after consulting with
the real estate industry. In prescribing minimum standards, however, the
legislature should not limit the ability of a trustee to conduct additional mar-
keting activities. Indeed, in order to meet the second part of the three-part
test for reasonable equivalence, as adopted by Lindsay and endorsed by the
authors, the marketing efforts of the trustee must demonstrate an actual ef-
fort to obtain the highest price possible under the circumstances. 169 Existing
Texas law also appears to impose a similar duty on trustees. 170 Unlike ex-
168. 26 U.S.C. § 7425 (1982).
169. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 150. Existing statutory procedures restrict that duty to strict compli-
ance with the statute and the terms of the deed of trust. Only where the trustee is excercising
discretion does a higher obligation arise.
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isting procedures, however, it is intended that the new procedures give the
trustee the flexibility actually to fulfill that duty.
In most cases, of course, the trustee should list the property with a li-
censed real estate broker on or before the posting date. It can be expected
that competent real estate brokers would know how best to advertise a prop-
erty for sale. 17 1 Moreover, because a real estate agent will only be paid if the
property sells, the real estate agent has an incentive for marketing the prop-
erty to the best advantage of both the lender and the debtor.
5. Bifurcate the Public Sale
Clearly the most significant deterrent to participants at a nonjudicial fore-
closure sale is the requirement to bid on property and consummate the trans-
action on the courthouse steps without the benefits of even the most basic
due diligence. Borrowing conceptually again from the ULTA, the authors
propose that the successful bidder at a public sale, other than the secured
creditor, be required to deposit with the trustee (or with a designated repre-
sentative of the trustee) at least 10% percent of the bid price in cash or bank
obligation and enter into a contract to purchase the land.172 The contract,
like a trustee's deed, would be executed by the trustee on behalf of the mort-
gagor. The contract could contain all such customary terms and conditions
relating to inspections and reports as may be negotiated by the buyer and the
trustee.
If the marketing effort has been successful, the trustee, in theory will have
pre-negotiated a contract form as a result of contacts from a number of in-
terested buyers who will finalize their offers at the public sale. As this sys-
tem has time to work, however, it is anticipated that deeds of trust may be
drafted specifying certain warranties that the trustee may give on behalf of
the mortgagor in a contract executed in connection with such a public sale.
If the contract is not closed, the trustee may enforce the remedies therein
provided against the highest bidder, if any, or resell the property by readver-
tising for another public sale in the manner previously described. 173 To the
extent that the trustee becomes entitled to the deposit, it should be applied
against the debt in the same manner as the proceeds of a completed sale. 174
6. Terminate the Equity of Redemption at Public Sale
Although the trustee would not deed the property to the successful bidder
at the public sale under the revised procedures advocated by the authors, the
execution of the contract of sale could effectively burden or "clog" the
debtor's equity of redemption to the extent the contract thereafter closed. 175
171. See ULTA § 3-508 comment 1, 13 U.L.A. 476, 613, (1975).
172. Id. § 3-508(b), 13 U.L.A. at 614. If the secured creditor is the successful bidder at the




175. See Crestview, Ltd. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 621 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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In other words, once a contract was executed, the debtor could no longer
pay off the debt and receive his land back because the contract would be
binding upon the debtor. The authors believe this is a necessary and una-
voidable result of the bifurcated approach. Accordingly, it would probably
be appropriate for any new legislation to recognize this clogging as
permissible.
Z Facilitate Secured Creditor's Right to Possession
Because the time between notice and ultimate consummation of the sale is
somewhat longer under the procedures recommended by the authors, and
because potential purchasers will demand access to the property to perform
due diligence, a summary judicial proceeding to give possession of or access
to the property is desirable in the event the debtor is uncooperative. As
provided in ULTA section 3-508, special protections for residential property
occupied by a debtor may be required. Likewise, as provided in ULTA sec-
tion 3-504, certain protections may need to be provided to the creditor aris-
ing from its possession of the property prior to foreclosure.1 76
. Recognition of Inherent Inequities
The authors recognize that most borrowers will complain that the forego-
ing proposals do nothing to eliminate the inherent inequity of any foreclo-
sure that occurs during a significant downturn in the market, or when no
market exists. Despite compliance with all of the foregoing recommenda-
tions, the secured creditor may still be the only bidder at the sale. In balanc-
ing the interests of borrowers and lenders, however, the authors cannot
perceive of any ready solution to this inherent problem in the enforcement of
liens on real estate. A property's value from time to time necessarily fluctu-
ates. While it may be true that if a lender is patient and waits long enough a
particular property will increase in value, a borrower who has agreed to pay
a debt at a specific time and who has pledged property as security for that
debt must accept the risk that the pledged property may not produce a price
at foreclosure sufficient to discharge the debt at the time the debt becomes
due. Moreover, regardless of the property's fair market value as determined
by an appraiser, the debtor must also assume the risk that despite all realistic
and reasonable efforts to market the property in the context of a foreclosure
sale, buyers willing to pay that appraised value may not exist. Accordingly,
the authors believe that neither fairness nor the concept of reasonable equiv-
alence under the Bankruptcy Code requires that a nonjudicial foreclosure
process provide a solution to the soft or no-market problem.
9. Constitutional Issues
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss in detail the constitutional
176. The legislature should also protect creditors and trustees for liability associated with
the disclosure of information regarding the property to the extent such disclosure is made in
connection with a sale.
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issues presented by the foregoing proposals, but it is relevant to point out
that many, if not most, deeds of trust currently in use state that the foreclo-
sure procedures are to be in compliance with section 52.001 of the Texas
Property Code "as it may be amended from time to time." Accordingly, to
the extent these proposals are challenged solely on the basis of the impair-
ment of the obligation of pre-existing deeds of trust, it may be that the par-
ties have already contracted for a change in law. 1 7 7 That issue, however, can
be left for another article if the foregoing proposals, or some variation
thereof, are ever adopted.
IV. CONCLUSION
The statutory procedures mandated by current Texas law are inadequate
either to provide the debtor with a reasonable expectation or to provide the
creditor with a means of assuring that the maximum price is obtained for the
sale of land through a nonjudicial foreclosure. While the early efforts of the
Texas Legislature to curb the abuses of the unregulated use of powers of sale
may have helped to assure that a debtor could attend the sale and attempt to
protect his equity in the land by either repaying the secured debt or bidding
at the sale, the procedures, adopted in 1889 and, with a few modifications,
still in use today, have done little to increase participation at such sales by
interested buyers.
The recent efforts by the Texas Legislature to change existing foreclosure
law by limiting a lender's rights to a deficiency judgment following a foreclo-
sure sale based upon the introduction of evidence regarding fair market
value, moreover, would unfairly penalize the secured lender holding a lien
on real estate. While it is common for debtors to speak in terms of giving the
property back to the lender, in most cases the lender never had the property
to begin with, nor was it ever the lender's intent or desire to be forced to
have the loan it made to a debtor repaid by the land rather than cash. After
all, "[t]he purpose of a mortgage is not to enable the mortgagee to acquire
the mortgaged property but to secure him in the payment of his debt."'178
Anti-deficiency statutes, one-action rules, and redemption periods,1 7 9 as
adopted in the various states, may protect the debtor from the effects of a
foreclosure procedure that inevitably produces an inadequate price, but they
penalize the lender who is given no alternative but to follow archaic proce-
dures that simply do not permit the property to be marketed so as to pro-
duce the highest price possible in the context of a forced sale. Furthermore,
in light of bankruptcy's fraudulent conveyance principles, a foreclosure sale
can be set aside, notwithstanding anti-deficiency statutes, one-action rules,
or redemption periods.' 8 0
177. Wylie v. Hays, 114 Tex. 46, 263 S.W. 563 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924, opinion
adopted).
178. Pearce v. Stokes, 155 Tex. 564, 291 S.W.2d 309, 312 (1956).
179. A "redemption period" is any of a variety of post foreclosure time periods granted by
statutes in many states during which a borrower can redeem foreclosed property by paying the
unpaid balance of the secured debt. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1149 (5th ed. 1979).
180. For an excellent discussion of the failure of anti-deficiency statutes, one-action rules,
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Since the Texas Legislature is almost certain to reconsider legislation af-
fecting Texas foreclosure law in its next session, the authors hope that the
more comprehensive approach briefly outlined in section III of this Article
will stimulate discussion of these proposals so that some similar, but refined,
proposals could be considered by the Texas Legislature. Such an approach
would benefit both lenders and debtors, and, it is hoped, serve to reconcile
state foreclosure procedures to the fraudulent conveyance provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code.' 18
and redemption periods to resolve the inherent unfairness of current foreclosure practices, see
Washburn, supra note 159.
181. The authors acknowledge that any reconsideration of nonjudicial foreclosure laws
should also encompass judicial foreclosure laws. Because judicial foreclosure is so rarely used
in Texas, however, a discussion of judicial foreclosure remains for a future article.
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